A long historical tradition has set the survey of Melissus’ thought on the basis of the comparison with Parmenides. In fact, it seems impossible to talk about the first without reference to the second. Thus, it was rarely doubted that Melissus was an Eleatic, at least honoris causa.

Classically, the comparison between the two philosophers has taken the form of an analysis of differences between the characters of the objects of their deductions. Recently, more sophisticated analyses focusing on further elements of difference have been proposed. Nonetheless, additional points for comparison still remain, usually neglected, which allow us to hold that Melissus’ philosophy was neither the distorted and trivializing interpretation of Parmenides’ poem, nor an attempt to improve the eleatism. Based on the data presented here, it is reasonable to recognize in Melissus a thinker in conflict with Parmenides, albeit sharing some assumptions. Melissus’ procedure appears, in fact, as an attempt to replace the teaching of Parmenides with a new self-sufficient doctrine that partly takes on the same formal features (to the point of being almost confused with its model) but nonetheless possesses a different theoretical value and advances a quite different vision of reality. This strategy can be regarded as partially successful, at least with respect to its ancient reception.