Autor: Bruno Aislã Gonçalves Santos

Resumo:

Generally it is argued that the Objective List Theory (OLT) cannot support an explanatory view of what well-being is because OLT cannot identify one single good-maker property that it is responsible for unifying all the element that compose well-being. Then, Objective List Theory only can be an enumerative view of well-being. In this paper, I aim hold that we may offer an explanatory view of well-being even without identify a single good-maker property that is shared by all the elements that compose well-being. I hold that the OLT is still explanatory, because it is possible to identify each good-maker property in each element that is supposed to compose the list that is responsible for defining what well-being is. In addition, I hold that in order to have a full explanation about the concept of well-being we need to keep separate two question: 1) why something is good intrinsically and; 2) How the things that are good intrinsically could benefit us. My conclusion is that we may conceive one explanatory and pluralistic list that having constitutive elements of well-being and that a good explanation of well-being should keep separating the two question listed above.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2015v14n3p451

Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/1677-2954.2015v14n3p451/32062

Palavras-Chave: Well-being,Objective List Theory