Autor: Stanley Kreiter Bezerra Medeiros

Resumo:

This paper focuses on elements that are involved in a specific type of judgment, namely, those involving facts that, in virtue of contingent reasons, are out of our epistemic reach. Its goal is to propose a philosophical explanation about why we, in informal contexts, take some facts as contingently unknowable. In order to accomplish that goal, we develop a theory that defines contingently unknowable facts in a very specific way. We establish three clauses that are jointly necessary and sufficient — so we argue — for taking an arbitrary fact as contingently unknowable. In a variety of contexts, this strategy has the potential of reducing efforts in an epistemological analysis of this particular type of unknowability.

ISSN: ISSN: 1414-4217

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n1p61

Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n1p61/35803