Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia
Vol 17, No 1 (2013) • Principia: an international journal of epistemology
Autor: Federico Matías Pailos, Pablo Di Paolo
Abstract:
Conciliatory views on disagreement claim that one should “split the difference” between the epistemic peers’ opinions. Nevertheless, when they apply to the disagreement on conciliatory positions themselves, they give incoherent instructions. A semi-conciliatory position is one that accepts that the peers’ opinions are part of the whole body of evidence relevant in these situations. If one adopts this kind of view, all cases that seems to favor conciliatory views can be explained, and without compromising with the anti–intuitive consequences conciliatory positions have. In particular, a semi-conciliatory view is not condemned to give incoherent instructions when applied to disagreement about it.
ISSN: 1414-4217
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2013v17n1p1
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n1p1/26260
Palavras-Chave: Disagreement,peer,evidence,incoherence,intuit
Principia: an international journal of epistemology
"Principia: an international journal of epistemology" was founded in 1997 and regularly publishes articles, discussions and review. The journal aims to publish original scholarly work especially in epistemology area , with an emphasis on material of general interest to academic philosophers. Originally published only in print version (ISSN: 1414-4247), in 2005 the journal began to be published also in online version (ISSN: 1808-1711). Since 1999 are published three issues per year: in April, August and December. Qualis CAPES: A2