Epistemic Duties and Failure to Understand one's Evidence
Vol 16, No 1 (2012) • Principia: an international journal of epistemology
Autor: Scott Stapleford
Abstract:
The paper defends the thesis that our epistemic duty is the duty to proportion our beliefs to the evidence we possess. An inclusive view of evidenced possessed is put forward on the grounds that it makes sense of our intuitions about when it is right to say that a person ought to believe some proposition P. A second thesis is that we have no epistemic duty to adopt any particular doxastic attitudes. The apparent tension between the two theses is resolved by applying the concept of duty to belief indirectly.
ISSN: 1414-4217
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n1p147
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n1p147/22781
Palavras-Chave: ethics of belief,doxastic voluntarism,Episte
Principia: an international journal of epistemology
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"Principia: an international journal of epistemology" was founded in 1997 and regularly publishes articles, discussions and review. The journal aims to publish original scholarly work especially in epistemology area , with an emphasis on material of general interest to academic philosophers. Originally published only in print version (ISSN: 1414-4247), in 2005 the journal began to be published also in online version (ISSN: 1808-1711). Since 1999 are published three issues per year: in April, August and December. Qualis CAPES: A2