Epistemic value and fortuitous truth

Vol 1, No 1 (1997) • Principia: an international journal of epistemology

Autor: Colin Cheyne

Abstract:

Why are the conditions for propositional knowledge so difficult to discover or devise in this post-Gettier age? Why do not most epistemologists agree on roughly the same analysis as they appear to have done in the pre-Gettier paradise? I argue that the problem lies in that fact that the epistemologists' intuitive concept of knowledge appeals to desiderata that probably cannot be satisfied. Unfortunately, if we abandon some of these desiderata, it is difficult to settle on a concept of knowledge which is not too remote from our initial intuitions. I suggest that epistemology may be better off without the concept of knowledge. There are plenty of other interesting notions for us to be going on with.

ISSN: 1414-4217

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/%25x

Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/18774/17370

Principia: an international journal of epistemology

"PRINCIPIA
"Principia: an international journal of epistemology" was founded in 1997 and regularly publishes articles, discussions and review. The journal aims to publish original scholarly work especially in epistemology area , with an emphasis on material of general interest to academic philosophers. Originally published only in print version (ISSN: 1414-4247), in 2005 the journal began to be published also in online version (ISSN: 1808-1711). Since 1999 are published three issues per year: in April, August and December. Qualis CAPES: A2